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RECENT CASES
Administrative Law-Courts-Johnson Act-Jurisdiction of Federal
District Courts over Rate-Fixing Controversies When State Court Review
is Legislative-Corporation Commission of Oklahoma promulgated an order
reducing the rates chargeable by gas company, which thereupon sought an
injunction in the federal district court, alleging that the rates set were confiscatory. Corporation Commission contested the court's jurisdiction because
of the Johnson Act, which provides, inter alia, that if a "plain, speedy, and efficient remedy" is available in the state courts, the federal district courts are
deprived of original jurisdiction over rate-making controversies. An injunction was granted by the lower federal court. Held (per curiamn), on appeal,
that since there was no "plain, speedy, and efficient remedy" available in the
state courts, the lower federal court did not commit error by assuming original
jurisdiction. CorporationCommission v. Cary, 56 Sup. Ct. 300 (Q935).
In this, the first litigation centering about the Johnson Act before it, the
Supreme Court, in effect, ruled that a "plain, speedy, and efficient remedy"
requires an available judicial review by a state court, as distinguished from a
legislative review by that court,2 for, as it was not controverted that the gas
company could have appealed the commission-set rate to the state supreme
court, the sole basis for the instant decision was the undefined nature of the
review accorded by the Oklahoma court.' Furthermore, the Court's decision,
for two reasons, also makes it probable that a legislative review would be insufficient to satisfy the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: (i) the
few courts that have thus far dealt with the Johnson Act have interpreted its
requirements of "reasonable notice and hearing" 4 and "a plain, speedy, and
efficient remedy" 5 to mean such notice and hearing and such judicial remedy
as are required by the due process clause; and (2) there is no reason why the
requirements of the Johnson Act should be more stringent than those of the
due process clause, for the due process clause is the basis of the constitutional
rights of the utility, and if the latter is accorded full constitutional protection
by the state court procedure, there is then no reason for calling upon the original
jurisdiction of the federal courts. Furthermore, if this analysis is correct, the
instant court has in no way restricted the application of the Johnson Act, 6 the
purpose of which was to have the question of confiscation decided solely on the
evidence first brought before the state commission. 7 By confining original juris-

1. 48

STAT. 775, 28 U. S. C. A. §4I W ('1934).
The distinction between a judicial review and a legislative review lies in the power
granted to the court to replace the rate it finds either unreasonable or confiscatory. It is
only where the court has such a power that the review is legislative. See Merrill, Does
"Legislative Review" by Courts in Appeals from Public Utility Commissions Constitute Due
Process of Law? (1926) i IND. L. J. 247.
3. See district court opinion in 9 F. Supp. 709 (W. D. Okla. 1935).
4. Mississippi Power Co. v. City o~f Jackson, 9 F. Supp. 564 (S. D. Miss. 1935) ; Mississippi Power Co. v. City of Aberdeen, ii F. Supp. 951 (N. D. Miss. 1935), (1936) 84 U. oF
PA. L. Rav. 41g. The two cases, although applying the same test to similar facts, came to
directly opposing results.
5. The instant case appears to be the only one which has arisen involving "a plain, speedy,
and efficient remedy".
6. For an opposing view, based, however, on the "reasonable notice and hearing" requirement of the Johnson Act, see (1936) 84 U. OF PA. L. REV. 419.
7. See Hearings before Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives on
S. 752, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 18, 20, 27, 45, 49, 6o et seq.
2.

(654)
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diction over the commission-set rate to the state courts this end would be achieved,
for in the vast majority of states, court review is limited to the record formulated
by the commission,8 and this record is concerned almost entirely with the9 question of confiscation, whereas in original proceedings in the federal courts, there
is a trial de novo. The instant case in no way interfered with the effectuating
of such a desire, for it has decided only that a lower federal court has original
jurisdiction over a controversy arising out of a rate set by a commission in a
state where the procedure failed to accord a judicial review. The lower federal
court did not touch on the substantive question of confiscation; it granted
relief merely because a procedural element of due process, i. e., an available
judicial review within the state, was lacking. Moreover, the commission would
have gained nothing if the decision in the instant case had gone the other way,
for the rate would ultimately have been set aside either by the state court or by
the United States Supreme Court, on the ground that procedural due process
had not been accorded, since there was no judicial review in Oklahoma. If,
however, the state of Oklahoma had afforded a judicial review in its court procedure, the federal court could not have taken original jurisdiction because "a
plain, speedy, and efficient remedy" would then have been available in Oklahoma.
Therefore, under the ruling in the instant case the purpose of the Johnson Act is
not defeated, for at no time is the question of confiscation one which wil be
determined by the federal courts as a matter of original jurisdiction. The only
federal jurisdiction possible, if the state procedure meets the requirements of
the Johnson Act, is that resulting from a final appeal to the United States
Supreme Court. And in that review, the only records before the Court will be
those of the commission and of the state court which reviewed the commission's
findings.

Constitutional Law-Equal Protection of Laws-Privileges and Immunities-State Taxation of Money Lent Outside the State-Vermont
levied a tax on income derived from money lent, but exempted the "Interest
received on account of money loaned within this State . ... " '- Petitioner
appealed from the determination by the state tax commissioner. Held, (Stone,
Brandeis, and Cardozo, JJ., dissenting), that the appeal should be allowed, on
the ground that the statute was unconstitutional because it denied the equal
3
protection of the laws 2 and violated the privileges and immunities clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Colgate v. Harvey, U. S. L. Week, Dec. 17, 1935,
at i5 (U. S. Sup. Ct. 1935).
Both the majority and minority opinions accepted as well-established the
doctrine that the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does
not demand absolute equality of taxation provided there is a valid reason for
differentiation. 4 The majority, however, construing the exemption clause
literally, interpreted it to mean that there would be a differentiation according
to the place that the loan was made and not where the money was invested, and
therefore refused to perceive any purpose behind the classification in the Ver8. Lilienthal, The Federal Courts and State Regulation of Public Utilities (930)
L. REv. 379, 4o2 et seq.
9.Id. at 412.
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HAu-v.

i. Vt. Laws 1931, No. 17, § 3.
2. U. S. CONST. Amend. XIV, § i.

3. Ibid.
4. American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, i79 U. S.99 (Igoo) ; Board of Education
v. Illinois, 203 U. S. 553 (9o6) ; Concordia Fire Ins. Co. v. Illinois, 292 U. S.535 (934).
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mont act. The Court stated that the tax was, in their opinion, as arbitrary and
capricious as though based upon a difference in time rather than in locality"as, for example, a tax upon all income from loans except those made on
Mondays . . .".'

The dissenting justices, on the other hand, readily observed

that the purpose of the classification was to encourage the circulation of money
within Vermont. Whether the statute itself was expressive of this object is
controversial, but it appears that the result would be that indicated by the
minority opinion. The exemption from taxation of the income from money
lent within the state would tend to dissuade Vermont investors from seeking
sources of investment outside the state. Also, elimination of the tax burden
from money lent in Vermont would lower the rate of interest charged to borrowers there, thus stimulating the creation of credit within the state.
But it seems from the language of the majority opinion that the Court was
primarily motivated, in holding the statute unconstitutional, by the feeling that
to permit a state to differentiate between loans made within and without that
state would be to destroy the tradition that "we are one people, with one common
country." 1 This viewpoint is especially interesting in the light of the recent
A. A. A. decision 7 with its underlying philosophy of state's rights. In order to
give effect to their conviction that the exemption in the instant case violated the
spirit of a single sovereignty, the majority used the long dormant privileges
and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Heretofore, that protective feature of the federal Constitution had been held to prevent state interference with the privileges arising from a citizen's relationship with the federal
government, 8 and not state regulation of the interests derived from a citizen's
legal relations with a state government.9 As the dissent points out,' 0 since the
Slaughter-House Cases," in which the Court first rejected the theory that the
privileges and immunities clause applied to a citizen's relations with a state
government, there have been forty-four cases 12 in which state statutes were
attacked on this ground and in no case did the Court invalidate the legislation.
Thus it is clear that the present holding is novel and contrary to precedent both
in its application of the privileges and immunities clause and in its resurrection
of a long abandoned theory of the interests involved in federal citizenship, 13 by
broadening the concept of federal citizenship to include the privilege of receiving, free from taxation, the income from money invested outside the state,
when formerly, as was pointed out by Justice Stone, even the movements of a
citizen or his property from state to state, although protected by the commerce
clause, were not protected by the privileges and immunities clause.'- Furthermore, it greatly increases the judicial control of state legislatures by adding a
third to the Court's present "governing" ' 15 powers--the indefinable due
5. Instant case at 17.
6. Majority opinion at 17, quoting from Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 48 (U. S. 1867).
7. United States v. Butler, 56 Sup. Ct. 312 (1936), 84 U. oF PA. L. :REV. 547.
8. See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, 36 (1892) ; Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U. S.
377, 382 (1894).

9. Porter v. Wilson, 239 U. S. 170 (1915); Hamilton v. Regents,

293 U. S. 245 (1934).

Io. Instant case at 21.
11. 16 Wall. 36 (U. S. 1872).
12.

The cases are collected in footnote 2 of the dissenting opinion at

21.

13. See The Supreme Court Improvises, NEw REPuBLIc, Jan. I, 1936, at 213.
14. Instant case at 21 : "In no case since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment has

the privileges and immunities clause been held to afford any protection to movements of persons across State lines or other form of interstate transaction."
15. "Courts are not the only agency of government that must be assumed to have capacity to govern." Justice Stone, dissenting in United States v. Butler, 56 Sup. Ct. 312, 329
(1936). (Italics added.)
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process 16 and commerce clauses 17 of the federal Constitution. More specifically,
in the field of taxation, the holding is of importance in that it portends a drastic
restriction of state tax powers. One possible meaning of the decision is that
the states can no longer tax any activity which involves interstate commerce.
Although, if carried to its logical conclusion, such an interpretation may be
justifiable, nevertheless, the spirit of the majority opinion seems to indicate
that the true import of the decision is that a classification in a tax schedule
which is based on differences solely geographical will violate the privileges and
immunities clause. In this, the decision is a decided blow to provincialism and
is therefore to be welcomed, but its uncovering of a new twilight area in the
federal Constitution, is objectionable. However, the Court will probably refuse
to apply their new weapon to cases involving well defined fact situations, and
although the present decision appears to be absolutely contrary to hitherto
unquestioned principles,' s the exact effect of the holding and the true interpretation of the Court's opinion cannot be fully understood until there are further
controversies in which this new theory of the rights involved in federal citizenship is more fully advanced. 19
Constitutional Law-Interstate Commerce-Constitutionality of State
Occupation Tax on Gross Income of Radio Broadcasting Stations-State of
Washington levied an annual one-half of one per cent tax on gross income for
the "act or privilege of engaging in the business of radio broadcasting."'
Plaintiff, a domestic radio broadcasting corporation sought to enjoin the defendant tax commission from enforcing the tax against it. Held, that the
injunction should be granted as the radio broadcasting corporation was engaging
in interstate commerce, and therefore the tax was a direct burden on interstate
commerce and thus in contravention of the commerce clause of the United
States Constitution. 2 KVL, Inc. v. Tax Commission of Washington, 12 F.
Supp. 497 (W. D. Wash. 1935).
Following a long trend of authority,' the federal court came to a result
directly contrary to that which had been earlier reached by the Washington
Supreme Court in Fishers Blend Station v. Tax Commission of Washington 4
on almost identical facts. The instant result is fully in accord with the view
expressed in the December issue of the REVIEw, 5 in which the reasoning and
holding of the state court were criticized.

i6. U. S. CONST. Amend. XIV, § i.

x7. Id. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
I8. E. g., United States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U. S. 321 (1918) ; Schaffer v. Carter, 252 U. S. 37 (92o).
ig. By a resort to the theory that a tax on income is a tax on the property producing ita theory advanced principally by the Massachusetts courts [Opinion of the Justices, 220 Mass.
613, io8 N. E. 570 (9,5) ]-the interesting result would have been obtained of having the
state of Vermont attempting to tax property situated outside its jurisdiction. This conclusion has been re-emphasized recently [Kelley v. Kalodner, 181 Atl. 598 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1935)],
but because of the fallacies involved in the theory [see (1936) 84 U. OF PA. L. REV. 427], the
Court is to be commended for omitting it entirely from the opinions.
i. Wash. Laws 1935, c. i8o, § 74, amending WASH. REv. STAT. (Remington, 1934)

§§ 8326-1 to 8326-30.

2. U. S. Coxsr. Art. I, § 8 (3).
3. See cases cited in instant case at 5o.
4. 45 P. (2d) 942 (Wash. 1935). The instant federal court referred to the Fishers,
Blend Station case, but said it preferred to follow the precedents set by the federal courts
rather than the Washington decision.
5. (1935) 84 U. OF PA. L. REV. 251. See also Legis. (1936) 49 HARv. L. REV. 473; Note
(936) 45 YALE L. '9. 495.
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Constitutional Law-Securities Act of 1933 as a Valid Exercise of the
Postal Power of Congress-In accordance with the provisions of the Securities Act of 1933,1 a subpcena was served on respondent to appear before the
Securities and Exchange Commission to testify regarding a registration statement which he had filed with it. Upon his refusal to appear, the Commission
petitioned the United States district court for an order directing him to comply,
which was granted. 2 Respondent appealed from this order on the ground that
the Act was unconstitutional. Held, that it was within the postal power3 of
Congress to require registration of securities to prevent "the use of the mails
to promote and consummate the sales of misrepresented securities." Jones v.
Securities and Exchange Commission, 79 Fed. (2d) 617 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935),
cert. granted, U. S. L. Week, Feb. 4, 1936, at 483.
Though literally the power of Congress is only "to establish post-offices
and post-roads", it is well established that it is not limited to that function.
Acting on the theory that "the hand which bestows privileges may also withhold them", 4 Congress has enacted much legislation designed to protect the
postal system from being used for purposes injurious to the public welfare.5
Moreover, the Supreme Court has as yet set no express limitation upon Congress' power over the mails. In fact, it has repeatedly said that the manner in
which the power is to be exercised is wholly within the discretion of Congress.6
Hence, it would appear that the court, in the instant case, was fully justified in
upholding the power of Congress to protect investors by excluding fraudulent
securities from the mails.7 And once it is established that it has such power, it
is clear, as the court held, that Congress can compel registration of securities
with a commission created by it, in order to determine whether they conform
to the prescribed standards. Because of the factual situation presented, the
court, in the instant case, found it unnecessary to pass upon the validity of more
doubtful provisions, which must be approved before the entire Act can be said
8

to be without constitutional infirmity.

1. 48 STAT. 74 (1933), 15 U. S. C. A. §77 (Supp. 1935).
2. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Jones, 12 F. Supp. 21o (S. D. N. Y. 1935).
3. U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 8 (7).
4. Cushman, National Police Power Under the Postal Clause of the Constitution (1920)
4 MINN. L. REV. 402, 403.
5. See, for example, 35 STAT. 1130 (igog), 18 U. S. C. A. § 338 (927).
Such legislation has been uniformly upheld. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727 (1877) ; Public Clearing
House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497 (19o4); Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U. S. 288
(1913) ; Badders v. United States, 240 U. S. 391 (I916). For an interesting discussion of
Congress' power over the mails, see Rogers, The PostalPower of Congress, 34 JOHNS Hop1INS UNIVESITY STUDIEs IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL ScENCE (1916) No. 2, I58 et seq.
6. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727, 732 (1877) ; In re Rapier, 143 U. S. 11o, 134 (1892).
7. The "Blue Sky" cases make it clear that requiring registration of securities does not
violate due process. Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U. S. 539 (1917); Caldwell v. Sioux
Falls Stock Yards Co., 242 U. S. 559 (1917).
8. It is to be noted that Congress, realizing that means other than the mails might be
used to avoid the provisions of the Act, made it unlawful to use any instrumentalities "of
transportation or communication in interstate commerce" unless a registration statement was
filed and approved. 48 STAT. 77 (I933), 15 U. S. C. A. § 77 (e) (Supp. 1935). Hence, ultimately it will have to be decided whether Congress has such power under the commerce clause.
Lower federal courts have already indicated that securities are subjects of interstate commerce. See, for example, 21o Fed. 173, 182 (E. D. Mich. 1914). But the United States Supreme Court has not as yet committed itself. See Hall v. Geiger-Jones, 242 U. S. 539, 558
(1916). It would seem that there is a sufficient analogy with the lottery cases to justify the
Court in holding securities subjects of interstate commerce. See Note (1934) 32 MIxcr. L.
REv. 81I. See also, for more extended discussion of the constitutionality of the Act, Isaacs,
The Securities Act and the Constitution (933) 43 YALE L. J. 218; Legis. (1933) 33 CoL. L.
REv. 1220.
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Contracts-Duress-Recovery of Money Paid on Agreement for
Abandonment of Mala Fide Taxpayer's Suit-County had an option to purchase P's property for a courthouse site. P was a woman seventy-four years
of age, whose property was being threatened with foreclosure. D filed a taxpayer's suit to enjoin the issuance of bonds for the courthouse project, but
apparently the suit was brought without a reasonable belief of success and with
the sole purpose of annoying P. D induced P to sign an agreement to pay to D
3%% of the purchase price in consideration for D's abandoning the equity suit.
In fulfillment of the agreement, D abandoned the suit, and P deposited a deed
of the property with Title Company, which received the purchase price from
the county and paid to D his percentage. Held, P could recover, since the payment was not voluntary on her part but was made under the duress of the equity
Suit, threatened in bad faith at a time when P would have lost her property
through foreclosure had the suit been continued. White v. McCoy Land Co.,
87 S. W. (2d) 672 (Kan. City Ct. App. 1935).
In holding that the evidence warranted a finding of duress, the court
rejected the "reasonable man" doctrine of the early common law,1 and followed
the modem tendency, permitting the age, sex and peculiar circumstances of the
party to be considered in determining whether there was an exercise of free
will. 2 The "wrongful" act 3 threatened by D was the continuance of the equity
suit, which had apparently been brought to annoy P, and in view of P's financial
circumstances, the finding of duress was clearly justified. But, granting that P
could have avoided the agreement on the grounds of duress, 4 it does not necessarily follow that money actually paid may be recovered, for ordinarily money
paid in mistake of law, and with full knowledge of the facts, is not recoverable. 5
An exception is made when the payment has been made under duress," provided
the duress continued up to and existed at the time of the actual payment.7 In
the instant case, there was no wrongful pressure at the time of the payment to
D, as the suit had been abandoned several months previously. But nevertheless,
the court justified recovery on the grounds that the payment was not a voluntary
payment by P, since she had never received the money, payment having been
made by the Title Company, in accordance with the terms of the agreement,
upon receipt of the purchase price from the county. The theory of the court
rests on the somewhat tenuous argument that since the Title Company's authority to pay D his percentage was obtained by duress, the actual payment
under that authority was likewise obtained by duress. But it would seem that
since the authority was given under the terms of an agreement induced by
duress, it could have been revoked by P before payment to D; and, therefore,
the failure to so revoke after the removal of the duress amounted to an assent
by P to the payment. Thus the payment, being voluntary and as a result of a
i. WMI.L.STON, CONTRACTS (1924) § i6oi.
2. International Harvester Co. v. Voboril, 187 Fed. 973 (C.
Kansas City Home Tel. Co., 223 Mo. 537, 123 S. W. 6 (I9O9).

C. A. 8th, 1911) ; Wood v.

3. It is necessary that D threaten to do a "wrongful" act. WMIsToN, CONTRACrS (1924)

§ i6o6. The meaning of "wrongful" act is vague, but in situations like the instant case, it

might be defined as an act which one has no legal right to do, for the Missouri courts apparently consider one as not having a legal right to sue unless he has a reasonable belief of
success. Winter v. Kansas City Cable R. R., i6o Mo. i59, 6I S. W. 6o6 (igoo).
4. Smith v. Coker, nio Ga. 654, 36 S. E. io7 (igoo) ; Hullhorst v. Scharner, I5 Neb. 57,
17 N. W. 259 (1883) ; McNair v. Benson, 63 Ore. 66, 126 Pac. 2o (1912).
5. Ferguson v. Butler County, 297 Mo. 20, 247 S. W. 795 (923); McClure v. Trask,
161 N. Y. 82, 55 N. E. 407 (1899).
6. Rees v. Schmits, 164 Ill. App. 250 (1911) ; Beckwith v. Frisbie, 32 Vt. 557 (i86).
7. Thus where payments have been made after removal of the duress, there can be no
recovery by the payer.

Bushnell v. Loomis, 234 Mo. 371, 137 S. W. 257 (Ig).
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mistake of law only, should not be recovered. However, in view of the peculiar
exigencies of the case, which motivated the court to search for a legal justification for recovery by a deserving plaintiff, the decision cannot be condemned.
Criminal Law-Double Jeopardy6-.-Effect of Writ of Habeas Corpus
after Conviction on Sunday-Relator's trial for disorderly conduct was
begun on Saturday, but the verdict of guilty was returned, judgment rendered,
and sentence imposed on Sunday, whereupon relator sued out a writ of habeas
corpus and obtained his release on the ground that the judgment was void because rendered on Sunday.' Having been retaken into custody upon a new
charge of the same offense, he was again ordered released, this time on the
ground of double jeopardy.2 The appellate division reversed the order.3
Held (one judge dissenting), that the trial court's order of release was correct.
People ex rel. Meyer v. Warden of the County Jail, Nassau County, N. Y. L. J.,
Jan. 25, 1936, at 447 (N. Y. Ct. App. 1936).
The instant court followed the dogma that where a court has jurisdiction
and all prior proceedings are valid, a prisoner is placed in jeopardy as soon as
the jury is sworn and evidence given.4 The ground of the dissent was that the
relator, by suing out a writ of habeas corpus, had waived his right to plead double
jeopardy, and that habeas corpus should have the same effect as a motion for
new trial, or a motion to arrest or to vacate judgment, or an appeal.5 While
the dissent has a sentimental appeal, the majority opinion is correct legalistically.
Motions for a new trial, or arrest of judgment, or vacating of judgment, and
appeals are held to have the effect of waiver 1 on the theory that the defendant
thereby expressly or impliedly asks for a new trial, 7 whereas a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus, being merely a request for release from unlawful custody
and not an implied request for a new trial, cannot properly be construed as a
waiver. Although the thought that a criminal should escape punishment on such
tenuous procedural grounds may be shocking, the above principles apparently8
preclude a solution without recourse to legislation or constitutional amendment.
i. The court adopted the view that'the proceedings on Sunday were void. Instant case
at Col. i. The more accurate view, however, is that the rendering of a verdict, being a ministerial act, may properly take place on Sunday, but that the pronouncment of judgment, being
a judicial act, may not take place on Sunday. See Stone v. United States, 167 U. S. 178, i96
(1897) ; Note (1912) 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 844. Habeas corpus, it has been held, may properly be granted where the court has jurisdiction originally, but its judgment is void. Bandy
v. Hehn, io Wyo. 167, 67 Pac. 979 (1902).
2. N. Y. CONsT. art. I, § 6: "No person shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for
the same offense."
3. The ground was that there was no difference between proceedings by way of appeal
and those by way of habeas corpus (two justices dissenting). People ex rel. Meyer v. Warden of Nassau County Jail, 245 App. Div. 828, 281 N. Y. Supp. 86 (2d Dep't 1935).
4. People ex rel. Stabile v. Warden, 2o2 N. Y. 138, 95 N. E. 729 (1911) ; cf. i BIsHop,
CRIIINAL LAw (9th ed. 1923) 752.
5. Instant case at Col. 2.
6. United States v. Ball, 163 U. S. 662 (1896) ; Booker v. State, 151 Ala. 97, 44 So. 56
(i9o7) ; State v. Hart, 33 Kan. 218, 6 Pac. 288 (1885) ; i BisHoP, op. cit. pra note 4, § 998.
For the arguments on whether the constitutional right to plead double jeopardy should be
subject to waiver, see Comley, Former Jeopardy (1926) 35 YALE L. J. 674, especially at 681.
7. Cf. I BisH oP, loc. cit. supra note 6.
8. The situation involved in the principal case is so unique that the American Law Institute .failed to anticipate it in its proposed statute, ADmiNIsrATIoN OP THE CRIMiNAL LAw,
Section 12, which is so worded as to cure other evils, would apDOUBLE JEOPARDy (935).
parently not cure this one.
Had the judgment of conviction been proper and the sentence alone void, defendant would
properly have been remanded for resentencing. Bryant v. United States, 214 Fed. 51 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1914).
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Gold Clause Bonds-Right of Foreign Holder of Obligation of American Corporation Alternatively Payable in United States Gold Coin or
Abroad in Foreign Currency-Plaintiff, a Lichtenstein corporation doing
business in Holland, held bonds of the defendant, an American corporation;
defendant had contracted to pay on the interest coupons at the option of the
payee "in the city of New York twenty-five dollars in United States gold coin,
• . . or in Amsterdam, Holland, 62.25 guilders." The Joint Resolution of
Congress, on June 5, 1933, declared any obligation purporting "to give the
obligee a right to require payment in gold or a particular kind of coin or currency" of the United States to be against public policy and provided that every
obligation "payable in mpney of the United States" "shall be discharged upon
payment, dollar for dollar, in . . . legal tender." 1. When plaintiff presented
coupons for payment in Amsterdam, defendant defaulted. In an action on the
coupons, held, that plaintiff was entitled to recover damages in dollars equivalent
to 62.25 guilders calculated at the rate of exchange prevailing in New York at
the time of judgment, 2 this obligation Inot being subject to the Joint Resolution
because not payable in money of the United States. Anglo-Continentale
Treuhand, A. G. v. St. Louis & S. W. R. R., N. Y. L. J., Jan. 20, 1936, at i
(C. C. A. 2d, 1936).

As indicated in last month's issue of this REvIEw,8 the two courts which
have had the opportunity to determine the effect of the Joint Resolution on
obligations alternatively payable in multiple currency have arrived at opposite
conclusions. 4 The result in the instant case, however, involving as it does a
foreign holder of an American bond, is implied even in the apparently contradictory City Bank FarmersTrust Co. opinion, which indicated that it limited
to domestic holders its decision that under the Resolution they had no right to
payment in foreign currency.5 But the court in the instant case refused to rely
on a distinction involving such dangerous implications from the standpoint of
international finance,6 and unequivocally based its decision on the proposition
that an obligation which expressly entitles its holder to payment in Dutch
guilders is not "payable in money of the United States" within the meaning of
the Resolution.7 While the court's treatment of foreign currency as a com1. 48 STAT. 112 (1933), 31 U. S. C. A. §463 (Supp. i934).
2. I. e., $42-.325 on each coupon instead of the $25 face value which defendant contended
was the extent of its obligation.
3. (1936) 84 U. OF PA. L. REv. 543, 545.

4. City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 244 App. Div. 634, 280 N. Y.
Supp. 494 (ist Dep't 1935) (American holder held entitled only to face value in dollars and
not to dollar equivalent of the specified guilders). Contra: McAdoo v. Southern Pac. Co.,
io F. Supp. 953 (N. D. Cal. 1935). See (935) 35 CoL. L. REv. 1132; 49 HARV. L. REV. 152.
5. 244 App. Div, 634, 636, 28o N Y. Supp. 494, 497 (1935).

This followed from the

court's reliance on the economic argument enunciated by Chief 'Justice Hughes in Norman
v. B. & 0. R. R., 294 U. S. 240, 315 (I935), that the purpose of the Joint Resolution was to
protect the domestic economy from the burdens of a disparity ithin the national currency
system.
6. See Eder, Legal Theories of Money (1934) 20 CORN. L.

Q.

52, 75. As no distinction

is observed between domestic and foreign holders, the fact that plaintiff acquired the bonds
after the date of the Joint Resolution is not important in the court's opinion. But if the
distinction were drawn, possible variations in result might depend on the time of acquisition
by the foreign holder, as well as on his good or bad faith. See Nussbaum, Multiple Currency and Index Clauses (1936) 84 U. OF PA. L. REv. 569, 585.
7. This was likewise the ratio decidendi in the McAdoo case, as well as the ground of
the dissenting opinion in the City Bank Farmers Trust Co. case, both cited supra note 4, and
by a straightforward reading of the language of the Joint Resolution would seem to be an
inescapable conclusion. A variation in approach was relied on to reach a similar result in a
recent English case involving the rights of a foreign holder of bonds of a foreign sovereign
which were floated in America. Payment in United States gold coin in America being regarded as impossible by law, this alternative was discharged, thus leaving payment in one of
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modity "like wheat or shoes" is not accurate from the point of view of business
and financial usage,8 the result reached seems the only one acceptable as a matter
either of logic or of law, a conclusion that is supported by the full discussion of
this question appearing in a leading article in this issue of the REvIW.9

Process-Validity of Substituted Service upon Non-resident Motorist
Whose Wife Signed Return Receipt-Statute, permitting service of process
upon secretary of state as agent of non-resident motorists in actions arising
from automobile collisions on state highways, also required sending notice of
service and a copy of the declaration to the defendant by registered mail, and
filing of "the defendant's return receipt".-

The registered letter was delivered

to defendant's wife, who signed the return receipt therefor. Defendant, without
repudiating his wife's act, retained the registered matter and suffered judgment
by default. Held, that the service was valid, because the return receipt was "the
defendant's return receipt". Employers' Liability Assur. Corp., Ltd. v. Perkins,
181 Atl. 436 (Md. 1935).
Notwithstanding the doctrine that statutes authorizing substituted service
upon non-resident motorists should be strictly construed- because derogatory
of the common law,3 the provision requiring filing of "the defendant's return
receipt" has been liberally interpreted to require neither delivery of the registered letter to the defendant himself nor his personal signature upon the return
receipt,4 but only such substantial compliance as creates a reasonable probability
that the non-resident will be apprised of the suit." Therefore, the true rationale
of the decision in the instant case would seem to be not that the wife had implied
authority 6 to accept delivery of the letter and to sign the return receipt therefor,
nor that defendant ratified her unauthorized act by retention of the registered
the specified foreign currencies as the only possible performance of the contract. Matter of
International Trustee for Protection of Bondholders Aktiengesellschaft, N. Y. L. J., Dec. 7,
1935, at I (K. B. 1935), 84 U. OF PA. L. REv. 543.
8. See Eder, supra note 6, at 71; Nussbaum, Gold Clause Abrogatin. (1934)

L. J. 53, 59.
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9. Nussbaum, supra note 6.
i. Md. Laws 1931, c. 70, § i9oA. Such statutes are constitutional as a valid exercise of
the police power of a state to exclude from its highways persons not complying with the conditions upon which the use of the highways is allowed. Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S.
6Io (915); Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. i6o (1!16); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352
(927) ; O'Tier v. Sell, 252 N. Y. 40o, I69 N. E. 624 (1930).
But such statutes are violative

oqf due process unless there is a provision making it reasonably probable that, as a result of
compliance therewith, the non-resident will receive notice of the suit. Wuchter v. Pizzutti,
276 U. S. 13 (1928) ; Grote v. Rogers, 158 Md. 685, 149 AtI. 547 (193o).
2. Felstead v. East. Shore Exp., Inc., 35 Del. 171, 16o Atl. 9io (932) ; Flynn v. Kramer, 27, Mich. 500, 261 N. W. 77 (I935).
3. At common law, a court could not acquire jurisdiction over the person of a nonresident, except by personal service of process upon him within the state or upon a person
within the state authorized to accept service for him. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1877) ;
McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S. 90 (1917); Piedmont-Mt. Airy Guano Co. v. Merritt, 154
Md. 226, 14o Atl. 62 (1928).
4. Gesell v. Wells, 229 App. Div. II, 240 N. Y. Supp. 628 (3d Dep't 1930), aff'd, 254
N. Y. 6o4, 173 N. E. 885 (1930) ; Shushereba v. Ames, 255 N. Y. 490, 175 N. E. 187 (93i).
5. Gesell v. Wells, 229 App. Div. II, 24o N. Y. Supp. 628 (3d Dep't 193o); Boyd v.
Lemmerman, ii N. J. Misc. 701, i68 At. 47 (Sup. Ct. 1933) (service invalid, where widow
signed return receipt for dead defendant).
6. The acts of the wife will more readily be determined to have been done with the husband's authority than will a stranger's acts. See Brown v. Woodward, 75 Conn. 254, 259, 53
Atl. 112, 115 (i92) ; French v. Spencer, 23 Pa. Super. 428 (1903) ; I MECHE , AGccY
(2d ed. 1914) 115.

RECENT CASES

matter without repudiation of her act, as the court reasoned, but rather that the
wife's act sufficiently conformed with the statute by rendering it reasonably
likely that, as in the ordinary home, her husband would learn of the suit. That
this theory, rather than agency doctrines, is the better explanation, is revealed by
an examination of the actual holdings of past cases. For example, where a
father signed the return receipt for his infant son, this was notice to the latterT
Similarly, the signature of the defendant upon the receipt is an unnecessary
formality, as is shown by the decision which accepted as the "defendant's return
receipt" one signed by a person authorized to receive mail for him.8 Also,
delivery of the registered letter and the return receipt to the defendant himself
satisfies the statute, despite his refusal to sign.9 Indeed, if the statute requires
no return receipt but only the mailing of a copy of the declaration, it is constitutional 10 because such action in itself makes it reasonably probable that the
defendant will be notified. Therefore, although the decision in the instant case
appears to be correct, it could have been placed upon a sounder ground than the
agency principle employed by the court.

Taxation-Constitutional Restrictions-Validity of Federal Special
Excise Tax upon Liquor Traffickers in Dry States-After repeal of the 18th
Amendment,' defendant, a retail beer dealer in Alabama, a dry state,2 paid a $25
federal tax,3 but was convicted for failure to pay "a special excise tax" of $iooo
imposed by Congress upon wholesale and retail liquor and beer dealers in dry
states only.- Upon certiorari, held (Cardozo, Stone and Brandeis, JJ., dissenting), that the statute was unconstitutional, upon the ground that it was not a
tax, but a penal measure intended to suppress intrastate liquor traffic, power to
regulate which was taken from Congress by the 2Ist Amendment. United
States v. Constantine, 56 Sup. Ct. 223 (1935).
Notwithstanding the presumption in favor of the validity of a statute 5 and
the dogma that courts will not delve beneath the surface of acts, 6 the Court's7
decision was in accord with the principle of the precedent Child Labor Tax Case
and the subsequently decided A. A. A. case, 8 that Congress may not, by its taxing power, encroach upon the state police power. Although the United States
has power to tax the exercise of occupations violative of state law,8 "no mere
7. Gesell v. Wells, 229 App. Div. II, 24o N. Y. Supp. 628 (3d Dep't 193o).
8. Syracuse Trust Co.v. Keller, 35 Del. 3o4, I65 Atl. 327 (1932) ; Shushereba v. Ames,
255 N. Y. 490, 175 N. E. 187 (1931).
Cntfra: Dwyer v. Shalek, 232
9. Creadick v. Keller, 35 Del. 169, 16o At. 909 (1932).
App. Div. 780, 248 N. Y. Supp. 355 (2d Dep't 1931).
io. Hartley v. Vitiello, 113 Conn. 74, 154 Atl. 255 (931).
i. U. S. CoxsT. AM ND. XXI, declared in force Dec. 5, 1933, repealed the prohibition
amendment, U. S. CoNsT. AmEND. XVIII, which empowered Congress to regulate intrastate
liquor sales.
2. ALA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1928) § 4621.
3. 20 STAT. 333 (1879), 26 U. S. C. A. § 1394 (935), imposes an annual tax on all dealers in alcoholic beverages at the following rates: Retail beer $20, retail liquor $25, wholesale
beer $5o, wholesale liquor $ioo.
4. 44 STAT. 95 (1926), 26 U. S. C. A. § 1395, 1397a (2) (1935), repealed by 49 STAT.
1014 (1935), 26 U. S. C. A. § 1395a (935).
5. See Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 212, 269 (U. S. 1827) ; Sinking-Fund Cases, 99
U. S. 700, 718 (1878).
6. See Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 130 (U. S. 181o) ; Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292
U. S. 40, 44 (I934).
7. 259 U. S. 20 (1922).
8. United States v. Butler, 56 Sup. Ct. 312 (1936) 84 U. OF PA. L. REV. 547.
9. License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462 (U. S. 1866).
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exercise of the art of lexicography", 10 such as the phraseology "a special excise
tax", can transform a penalty into a tax. That the statute exacted a penalty,
and not a tax, seems readily discernible.-' First, the act placed in one class, and
subjected to one tax, all persons engaged in any branch of the liquor business,
instead of classifying them and taxing each in accordance with the kind of business participated in, as revenue acts ordinarily do. A second indication of the
penal nature of the enactment is that the sum of $Iooo is enormously in excess
of the $2o regulatory duty which, with the exception of the $Iooo fee, was the
highest tax ever imposed upon retail beer dealers in any state, wet or dry, since
1879. 1" Moreover, since the statute required the wholesale liquor dealer to pay
only ten times his original tax of $ioo, while the retail beer dealer had to pay
fifty times as much, the heaviest burden fell upon the one Congress believed
least able to pay. Congress, if it had intended the statute to enact a true tax,
would have increased to a proportionate extent the duties upon all types of
liquor occupations contravening state law. 13 Again, the statute did not perform
the primary function of a tax-to provide for the support of the government; 14
for the imposition was probably too exorbitant to produce revenue.,5 Finally,
as indicative of a penalty was the fact that "the condition of the imposition is
the commission of a crime." 16

Taxation-State's Power to Tax Salary of Employee of Railroad of
Which Federal Government is Sole Shareholder-State Tax Commission
included as part of relator's taxable income the salary he earned as general
counsel for a railroad corporation organized in 1849, the entire capital stock of
which was acquired by the United States in 19o4. The Secretary of War
appoints the directors of the corporation, which operates a railroad, steamships,
and a hotel. Held, assessment confirmed because the corporation, although a
creature of the government, did not perform essential governmental functions.
io. United States v. La Franca, 282 U. S. 568, 572 (1931) ; see Macallen Co. v. Massachusetts, 279 U. S. 62o, 625 (1929) ; Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, 282 U. S. 379, 387
(0931).

ii. Neither opinion in the instant case considered the contention that the imposition, if a
tax, did not meet the constitutional requirement of uniformity, although the Circuit Court had
expressed grave doubt on this point because of the act's "ambulatory character, applying . . .
in this or that state . . . according to the state laws". Constantine v. United States, 75 F.
(2d) 928, 931 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935). It would seem, however, that the excise was uniform,
in the sense that it operated with identical effect wherever its subject was to be found. Head
Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580 (1884). The instant case cannot be distinguished from Florida
(Federal Estate Tax Act, permitting deduction of state inv. Mellon, 273 U. S. 12 (927)
heritance taxes, held valid, although Florida levied no inheritance tax). Further, the uniformity of an excise is to be judged as of the date of its enactment; if uniform then, it cannot be
rendered non-uniform by subsequent changes in state laws. Continental Ill. Bank & Trust
Co. v. United States, 6s F. (2d) 5o6 (C. C. A. 7th, 1933) ; Gottlieb v. White, 69 F. (2d)
792 (C. C. A. Ist, 1934). The statute in the instant case was enacted when every state was
dry (1926).
x2. Instant case at 227; Cleveland v. Davis, 9 F. Supp. 337 (S. D. Ala. 1934).
13 N. C. L. Rav. 3IO.
13. Note (935)
14. Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U. S. 20, 38 (1922) ; Cleveland v. Davis, 9 F. Supp. 337
(S. D. Ala. 1934).
1S. Green v. Page, 9 F. Supp. 844 (S. D. Ga. 1935).
I6. Instant case at 227; see Helwig v. United States, i88 U. S. 6o5, 613 (1903) ; Lipke
v. Lederer, 259 U. S. 557, 562 (1922). Administrative rulings on the statute also substantiate the view that Congress intended to punish infractions of purely local laws. After the
adoption of the act, the Treasury ruled that it imposed a penalty. T. D. 3911, V-2 Cum. Bull.
274. Following repeal of the i8th Amendment, the enactment was treated by revenue officials
as a special tax. Mim. 4077, XII-2 Cum. Bull. 5oo.
Cf. (1936) 49 HARv. L. RaV. 65o.
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People ex rel. Rogers v. Graves, 283 N. Y. Supp. 538 (App. Div. 3rd Dep't,
1935).
Until the beginning of the present century, it was well settled that the
property of the sovereign was absolutely immune from taxation; 1 that the
operation of its instrumentalities-to the extent that they actually were instrumentalities-was also immune,2 but that the property of the instrumentalities
was not immune unless the property, by being employed for a governmental
purpose, was itself the instrumentality; 3 and finally, that the salaries of employees of the government were within the immunity granted to its instrumentalities. 4 But in 1905, the six to three decision of the United States
Supreme Court in South Carolina v. United States4-upon which the instant
court relied heavily-introduced the qualifying principle that the activity" of
the sovereign states was immune from taxation only to the extent that it was a
"strictly governmental function". 7 Mr. Justice Brewer, for the majority, appeared to be apprehensive lest the contrary result would encourage a conversion
of the states to socialism and thus deprive them of a Republican form of government,8 and would also leave the federal government without revenue. Much
weight was given by the Court to an analogy to the tort liability of municipal
corporations while acting in a "proprietary" capacity.0 However, the dissent
of Mr. Justice White pointed out the novelty of the majority's principle, 0 and
rebutted the analogy to the tort liability cases by showing that the leading case"
establishing the immunity of the sovereign's property was one in which the
government was in fact acting in its "proprietary" capacity.'12 Nevertheless,
the Court has since frequently cited with approval the holding of South Carolina v. United States and expressly followed it in 1934 , in Ohio v. Helvering, 3
and within the last two years, three more cases,' 4 including the present one, have
been decided on this principle. The instant court, to justify its adoption of the
doctrine, emphasized the "proprietary, commercial" nature of the governmentowned corporation and its competition with private business,'" despite the fact
that neither the power of the government to perform these functions nor their
desirability was before the court. The real question for decision should have
i. Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U. S. 151 (1886); People v. Burke, 2o4 App. Div.
557, 198 N. Y. Supp. 6oi (4th Dep't 1923) ; 2 COOLEY, TAXATi N (4th ed. 1924) § 604. The
corporate entity fiction was disregarded in Whan v. Green Star S. S. Corp., 22 F. (2d) 483
(C. C. A. 2d, 1927) ; United States Shipping Board E. F. Corp. v. Delaware County, 7 F.
(2d) 40 (C. C. A. 3d, 1927) ; King County v. United States Shipping Board E. F. Corp., 282

Fed. 95o (C. C. A. 9th, 1922). But cf. Clallam County v. United States Spruce Production
Corp., 263 U. S. 341, 345 (1923). See (0935) 84 U. OF PA. L. REV. 263.
2. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. I8i9); 2 CooLEY. TAXATION § 6o6.
3. Thomson v. Pacific R. R., 9 Wall. 579, 591 (U. S. 1869); United States Housing
Corp. v. Watertown, 113 Misc. 679, 186 N. Y. Supp. 309 (Sup. Ct. 1920).
4. Dobbins v. Erie County, 16 Pet. 435 (U. S. 1842) ; Schlosser v. Welsh, 5 F. Supp. 993
(D. S. Dak. 1934) ; semble, Watson v. Commissioner, Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Jan. 21,
1936 at 1 (C. C. A. 3d, 1936) (where the taxpayer was held to be an independent contractor
and so not entitled to the immunity accorded a government employee).
5. 199 U. S. 437 (9o5).
6. (1934) 41 W. VA. L. Q. 76, 77, n. 2, points out that in fact it is the sovereign's property and not its operation which is taxed.
7. South Carolina v. United States, 199 U. S. 437, 461 (19o).
8. Id. at 454. U. S. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 4.
9. Id. at 461.

io. Id. at 471, 472.
II. Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U. S. 151 (1886).
12. South Carolina v. United States, 199 U. S. 437, 471 (1905).
13. 292 U. S. 360 (1934).
14. Helvering v. Powers, 293 U. S. 214 (1934) ; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Ten Eyck, 76 F. (2d) 515 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
15. Principal case at 544.
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been whether the state was to lose a source of revenue which it had had before
the federal government entered the field. As a practical matter, and ignoring the
question of "essentially governmental functions"--which is after all political in
nature-it is suggested that the sources of revenue should be crystallized, and
exemptions from taxation be limited as much as possible.' 6 The immunity here
involved might then be formulated in a more definite and judicial fashion by
holding the sovereign exempt from taxation while engaged only in the traditionally governmental functions, which would permit the Court to reach the
same decision by reasoning less subject to criticism. And finally, the application
of this principle in the instant case would scarcely have impaired the efficient
functioning of the government, 17 especially in view of the remoteness in effect
of the tax; for, not only was the tax imposed equitably upon all citizens of the
state, but the government was two steps removed from the burden of it-by the
interposition of the employee on whose salary the tax was levied and of the
corporation which paid the salary.

Taxation-Taxability of Business Trust as "Association" within Meaning of Income Tax Act-Trustees of four "business trusts" I contested federal income taxes levied upon the trusts as "associations", 2 contending that they
were subject only to the more favorable rates levied upon trustees "of property
held in trust." ' The agreements by which the trusts were formed granted to
the trustees the power to purchase, to finance, to develop, to rent, and to sell
various tracts of realty. In the principal case, the trustees had disposed of the
realty, consisting of a golf course, for shares of a corporation, and confined
themselves merely to collecting the dividends. No control was reserved to the
beneficiaries, who varied in number from two in one trust to 92o in another,
and whose interests were represented by transferable certificates. The trusts
were suable and had the power to sue in a common name, and limited liability
was contemplated by the deeds of trust. Held, that the trusts were taxable as
"associations", upon the ground that they constituted "an organized community
of effort for the doing of business" 4 and possessed the effectiveness and beneficial attributes normally obtained by adherence to an incorporation statute.
Morrissey v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 56 Sup. Ct. 289 (1935). The
Court, applying the same reasoning, decided on the same day three other cases
16. See dissent of Stone, J., in Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United States, 281 U. S. 570,
580 (1930). Powell, Indirect Encroachnt on Federal Authority by the Taxing Powers of
32 HARv. L. REv. 9o, 928, and Fraenkel, The Supreme Court and the Taxthe States (91)
ing Power of the States (1934) 28 IL. L. REv. 612, 624, indicate the recent tendency of the

United States Supreme Court to limit tax immunity.

17. In Trinityfarm Construction Co. v. Grosjean, 291 U. S. 466, 471 (1933), it was said
that immunity is given not because a particular tax imposes a serious burden on the operation of a governmental instrumentality, but because any interference, however slight, with
the operation of the governmental instrumentality is forbidden. Yet in many cases immunity

has been denied because the effect of the tax on the government was too remote. See Willcuts
v. Bunn, 282 U. S. 216 (1931); Thomson v. Pacific R. R., 9 Wall. 579 (U. S. 1869); 2
CooLEY, TAXATION § 607.

I. "Massachusetts Trust" or "business trust" is the term commonly used to designate
associations having the factual and legal attributes of those involved in the cases discussed
here. See Note (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 11o3.
2. 44 STAT. 9 (1926), 26 U. S. C. A. § 1696 (3) (1935). "The term 'corporation' includes associations, joint-stock companies, and insurance companies."
3. Id. at 32, 26 U. S. C. A. § 161 (a) (935).
4. Morrissey v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 56 Sup. Ct. 289, 295 (1935).
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involving similar facts. Swanson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 56 Sup.
Ct. 283 (managing apartment house); Helvering v. Colenan-GilbertAssociates,
56 Sup. Ct. 285 (managing twenty apartment houses) ; Helvering v. Combs, 56
Sup. Ct. 287 (drilling oil well).
The Supreme Court has now clarified a phase of tax law which had been
considerably confused by scores of irreconcilable opinions written by lower
courts endeavoring to follow the apparently conflicting cases of Crocker v.
Malley 5 and Hecht v. Malley.6 The former case, which stressed the exercise
of control over the trustees by the beneficiaries as the factor essential to the
taxing of a "business trust" as an "association", was disapproved by the latter,
which decided that the term "association" included ". . . 'Massachusetts
Trusts' . . . having quasi-corporate organizations under which they are en-

gaged in carrying on business enterprises." 7 Thereafter, the federal circuit
courts and the Board of Tax Appeals, uncertain as to the correct test, applied
several tests, varying from court to court and from year to year. Among the
more frequently mentioned criteria of an "association" were these: the purpose
of conducting an active business; 8 actually engaging in such a business; 9 the
grant of such powers, whether used or not, by the trust agreement to the trustees; 10 quasi-corporate procedure and structure; 11 and, in a few cases, control
by the beneficiaries.1 2 An occasional court was guided by the name bestowed
upon the group in the state of its formation, regardless of the nature of the suit
in which the christening occurred. 13 Fortunately, however, the four recent
decisions point the way to uniformity by the formulation of an elastic rule which
rejects arbitrary tests, and which permits the treasury department a wide dis5.

249 U. S. 223 (I§I9).

6. 265 U. S. 144 (924) (interpreted provisions identical with that cited supra note 2,
but part of a statute levying a corporate excise tax).
7. Id. at 157.
8. Moriss Realty Co. Trust, 23 B. T. A. 1076 (193i) ; Dolese & Shepherd Co., 3o B. T.
Compare Extension Oil Co., 16 B. T. A. io28 (929), aff'd sub lwm., Lucas
A. 117, (934).
v. Extension Oil Co., 47 F. (2d) 65 (C. C. A. 5th, i93i) with Twin Bell Oil Syndicate, 26
B. T. A. 172 (1932).

9. Smith v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 69 F. (2d) 9ii (C. C. A. 3d, i934) ; Little
Four Oil & Gas Co. v. Lewellyn, 35 F. (2d) 149 (C. C. A. 3d, i929) ; Joseph E. Swanson,
29 B. T. A. 1123 (x934). This test has been the most frequently applied.
This test has been freio. Appeal of Durfee Mineral Co., 7 B. T. A. 231 (1927).
quently disapproved, with that in note 9, supra, having been preferred to it. Tyson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 54 F. (2d) 29 (C. C. A. 7th, i93i) ; Ray Oil Co., 28 B. T. A.
However, the Supreme Court in the instant case adopted the minority view,
1205 (933).
saying that the character of the trust "was determined by the terms of the trust instrument."
Morrissey v. Commissioner o~f Internal Revenue, 56 Sup. Ct. 289, 296 (1935). The Court's
ruling appears to be desirable, as the power to engage in business at the fancy of the trustees
is valuable, and places the business trust in an advantageous position as conditions change.
ii. Alexander Trust Property, 12 B. T. A. 1226 (1928). This test has been loosely applied, but usually only in conjunction with one or more of the other tests mentioned in notes
8, 9, io, supra. Tyson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 68 F. (2d) 584 (C. C. A. 7th,
1933), cert. denied, 292 U. S. 657 (i934).
Usually, however, the
12. Neal v. United States, 26 F. (2d) 708 (D. Mass. 1928).
"control" test has been employed only in combination with other tests. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Brouillard, 7o F. (2d) i54 (C. C. A. ioth, 1934) ; Smathers Power TypeIn some cases, no particular test seems to have been
writer Co., 28 B. T. A. 327 (933).
employed. See Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Guitar Trust Estate, 72 F. (2d) 544
(C. C. A. 5th, 1934). Courts have not been unaware of the confusion in this field of law.
See Coleman-Gilbert Associates v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 76 F. (2d) 191, 193x94 (C. C. A. ist, 1935), rev'd sub iwon., Helvering v. Coleman-Gilbert Associates, 56 Sup.

Ct. 285 (i93s).
13. See White v. Hornblower, 27 F. (2d) 777, 778-779 (C. C. A. 1st, 1928).
Burk-Waggoner Oil Ass'n v. Hopkins, 269 U. S. no (I925).

Contra:
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cretion in effectuating the legislative intent to tax as "associations" all business
groups benefiting by the power to act as entities.14
Torts-Estoppel-Liability for Injuries by One in Whose Name Automobile is Registered-Defendant registered and insured an automobile
owned by his minor son in his own name in order to avoid compliance with a
Connecticut statute which required, as a prerequisite to the registration of a
motor vehicle owned by a minor, proof of his financial responsibility in the
form of insurance, bond, or money deposited with the state treasurer. Plaintiff sued defendant, as owner of the car driven by the son, for injuries sustained
in a collision in New York, under the New York statute 2 which makes the
owner of an automobile liable for damage caused by the negligence of the
operator, independently of any agency relationship. Held, (two justices dissenting) for the defendant, because he was not estopped to deny ownership.
Shuba v. Greendonner,283 N. Y. Supp. 297 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1935).
In recognition of the dangerous character of automobiles and better to
assure pecuniary satisfaction to persons injured thereby, statutes have been
enacted in various jurisdictions, making owners, as well as operators, liable for
injuries sustained as a resuit of the negligent operation of cars.8 Although the
defendant in the instant case was not the owner, the court would have been
justified in holding him liable as such in order to give effect to both the New
York and Connecticut statutes, for, by evading the latter statute, which vas
intended to assure the financial responsibility of youthfui owners, the defendant
sought to deprive injured persons of redress against both himself and his son.
But it is clear that the defendant could not have been precluded from pleading
ownership in another on the theory of estoppel, which requires reliance by the
plaintiff on the representation of the defendant, 4 which was, of course, absent
here. However, one of the dissenting justices contended that an estoppel existed because the defendant represented himself as owner, and a license was
issued to him by the public, represented by the state licensing agency, in reliance
upon that representation, and as a result an inherently dangerous instrumentality
was placed in the hands of the son.8 Nor, under ordinary tort principles, could
negligence be attributed to the defendant merely because he helped evade a
statute.6 And even if such negligence were found, it would scarcely be the
14. What constitutes doing business has been the subject of considerable discussion. The
instant case, by the inclusion of the mere collection of dividends and their distribution to
the beneficiaries as a business activity, extends the definition further than courts have previously been inclined to go. Prior cases have held this not to be a business. Zonne v. Minneapolis Syndicate, 220 U. S. 187 (191) ; McCoach v. Minehill & Schuylkill Haven R. R., 228
U. S. 295 (913) ; Julius Blum, 25 B. T. A. iI9 (1932). Contra: Sloan v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 63 F. (2-d) 666 (C. C. A. 9th, 1933). Cf. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220
U. S. 107, i69-7I (i911).
i. CoNN. REv. STAT. (i93o) §§ 8561, i6o9.
2. N. Y. CoNs. LAws (Cahill, I93O) c. 64a, § 59.
3. CAL. CIV. CODE (1931) § 1714%; IOWA CODE (i93i) § 5o26; MASS. GEN. LAWS (1932)

c. 231, § 85A; N. Y. CONS. LAWS (Cahill, I93O) c. 64a, § 59. However, in Connecticut, the
owner is not liable unless the car was driven for a family purpose or by a servant of the
owner working in the scope of his employment. Middleton Trust Co. v. Bregman, 118 Conn.
65I, 174 AtI. 67 (1934).
4. Messersmith v. American Fidelity Co., 232 N. Y. I6I, 133 N. E. 432 (892I) ; Georgia
Veneer and Package Co. v. S. H. & E. H. Frost, Inc., 168 S. C. 285, 167 S. E. Soo (1933) ;
Worsham Buick Co. v. Isaacs, 121 Tex. 587, 5I S. W. (2d) 277 (I932). But cf. Pontius v.
McLain, 113 Cal. App. 452, 460, 298 Pac. 541, 545 (I93I).
5. Principal case at 304.

6. But if the father could anticipate the injury he was negligent, and therefore directly
liable. Allen v. Bland, 168 S. W. 35 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914); see Wilcox v. Wunderlich, 73
Utah 1, 18, 272 Pac. 207, 213 (1928).

RECENT CASES

proximate cause of the injury7 However, although it has been held that registration is only prima facie evidence of ownership which can be rebutted, 8 since
the purpose of the statutes here involved was to protect the plaintiff as one of
the public, the court might have held registration was ownership for this purpose,9 and withheld the issue from the jury. 0 Failing to avail itself of this
means of holding the defendant liable, the court was left with no alternative
other than the rather tenuous theory of estoppel advanced by the dissenting

justice."'
Unfair Competition-Right of News Agency to Enjoin Broadcast of
Published News-Defendant radio station broadcast daily extensive news
programs made up of items taken from newspapers which were members of the
complainant news agency. Some of the news so appropriated was broadcast
verbatim, and all of it reached the public while the news was still fresh. Complainant sought to enjoin the broadcasts on the theory of unfair competition.
The district court refused to grant an injunction, on the ground that the news
agency should not be protected in view of the countervailing interest of the
public in the speedy dissemination of the news of the day.: On appeal, held,
that the injunction should issue. Associated Press v. KVOS, Inc., U. S. L.
Week, Dec. 30, 1935, at 9 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935).
Both the circuit court and the district court recognized that the interest
of the public was superior to the interest of the news agency in protecting itself
against gratuitous appropriation by the radio station. But the former, in accord
with the opinion expressed in a previous issue of this REVIEW, 2 realized that the
reduction in profits resulting from the appropriation might effectively discourage
the news agency from efficient newsgathering, and consequently deprive the
public of the service.
7. Gonschor v. Kelson, 114 Conn. 262, i58 Atl. 545 (1932)

;

Benesch v. Pagel, 1I

Wis.

620, 177 N. W. 86I (192o).

8. Meskiman v. Adams, 89 Ind. App. 447, 149 N. E. 93 (925); Nemzer v. Newkirk
Ave. Automobile Co., 91 Misc. 13, 154 N. Y. Supp. 117 (915).
9. One court has held liable one in whose name the car remained registered though title
had been transferred. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Allen, x58 Tenn. 504, 14 S. W. (2d)
724 (1929). See Bright v. Neal, i68 Tenn. II, 73 S. W. (2d) 686 ('934). But see Fulton v.
Kaler, 271 Mass. 23, 17o N. E. 81& (193o). A conditional vendee has been held to be an
"owner", and therefore liable. Leman v. L. A. W. Acceptance Corp. of R. I., 48 R. I. 363,
138 Atl. 215 (927).
io. Also, the jury might have found the evidence did not rebut the presumption. Uphoff
v. McCormick, 139 Minn. 392, 166 N. W. 788 (i918) ; Hammond v. Hazard, 40 Cal. App. 45,
iSo Pac. 46 (191g).
ii. Principal case at 304, cited supra note 5.
i. Associated Press v. KVOS, Inc., 9 F. Supp. 279 (W. D. Wash. I934).
2. (1935) 83 U. oF PA. L. REv. 694.

